Security & data handling
How Toggle handles trust.
This page describes the current design and its boundaries; it is not a certification or security audit.
Last updated September 21, 2026
Where information goes
Toggle’s hosted architecture uses Railway for the web/API and MDM services, Cloudflare D1 for application data, and the MDM service’s separate protocol database for enrollment and command state.
Account and controller access
Account authentication identifies the customer. The helper stores controller signing material in the operating system credential store; pairing codes are short-lived. A browser request should not authorize a weaker policy on its own.
Device communication
Production endpoints require HTTPS. Enrollment identities and command identifiers bind device responses to issued requests. TLS protects transport but does not mean all stored data is end-to-end encrypted: service systems need access to process commands and inventory.
Minimum necessary data
App inventory is metadata for classification and restrictions, not a browsing or message-content feed. Avoid credentials and full device identifiers in support attachments.
Retention and deletion
Retention varies by operational purpose. No fixed deletion deadline or independently audited security claim is made on this page.
Report a vulnerability
Privately report a suspected issue by emailing support@toggleblocker.com. Include reproducible steps without accessing another person’s records or testing destructively.